Azerbaijan

Armenia’s Western Pivot: A Strategy to Delay Peace with Azerbaijan

In recent months, Armenia has intensified its rapprochement with the West, a strategic shift away from its traditional alliance with Russia. This realignment is most notably marked by joint military exercises with the United States, the Eagle Partner 2024 drills, and increasing cooperation with European powers. The timing of these exercises, coinciding with the visit of US Deputy Secretary of State Uzra Zei to Yerevan, demonstrates Armenia’s growing alignment with Western interests. Additionally, Armenia has received military aid from the European Union, which has sparked sharp criticism from Azerbaijan and Russia, both of whom see this assistance as a threat to regional stability.

This growing Western influence has allowed Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to distance himself from negotiations with Azerbaijan regarding a peace treaty. Pashinyan’s refusal to meet with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during the European Political Community Summit in July illustrates this strategy. While Azerbaijan insists on direct bilateral negotiations to settle their ongoing conflict, Armenia appears to be leveraging its newfound Western support to delay the peace process.

Pashinyan’s avoidance of peace talks seems to be a calculated move. By maintaining the perception of a military threat from Azerbaijan, he secures continued military and financial aid from the West. This tactic allows him to navigate internal political pressures, particularly from opponents who accuse him of conceding too much in negotiations. At the same time, Pashinyan’s efforts to preserve the territorial claims to Karabakh enshrined in Armenia’s Constitution serve as a significant barrier to concluding a peace deal.

Russia, meanwhile, has expressed its willingness to continue acting as a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow’s desire to retain influence in the South Caucasus is evident in its proposal to host further negotiations, a gesture Azerbaijan has accepted. However, Armenia has remained silent on this offer, preferring to maintain its current diplomatic position.

In response to Yerevan’s behavior, Baku has hardened its stance. President Aliyev reiterated that no peace treaty could be signed as long as Armenia’s constitution references unification with Karabakh. Armenian sources suggest that Pashinyan may be willing to amend the constitution by 2026, but with Armenia’s increasing alignment with the West, this timeline remains uncertain.

Ultimately, Pashinyan’s rapprochement with the West has allowed him to delay signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. While this strategy provides him with short-term political advantages, it risks prolonging the conflict. The situation may evolve if the 2024 US presidential election brings Donald Trump back to power, as Trump’s historically pragmatic approach to foreign policy could lead to less Western involvement in the South Caucasus, potentially pushing Armenia back to the negotiating table.

In conclusion, Armenia’s tilt toward the West has complicated the peace process with Azerbaijan, creating a delicate balance between internal political considerations and external alliances.