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The recent visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Russia occurred amidst significant regional realignments, most notably the premature withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh and the initiation of border establishment procedures between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This withdrawal marks a historic shift, as Karabakh becomes the first territory from which Russia has voluntarily and prematurely removed its forces, signifying a potential close to the protracted conflict in the region. This move has profound implications for the future of Russian-Turkish monitoring efforts in Aghdam and signals a definitive shift in Russia’s stance regarding the resettlement of Armenians in Karabakh.
Simultaneously, the early peacekeeper withdrawal hints at deeper bilateral agreements between Moscow and Baku, possibly paving the way for Azerbaijan’s closer integration with Eurasian economic structures. However, despite speculations of Azerbaijan joining the pro-Russian Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), President Aliyev’s statements at the COP29 forum clarified that while Azerbaijan remains open to future discussions, immediate plans to join the EAEU are not on the agenda. This stance reflects Baku’s cautious approach to balancing its economic interests with its geopolitical alliances, especially considering the potential repercussions of joining a pro-Russian bloc during the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Amidst escalating tensions between Moscow and Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s strengthening ties with Russia appear strategically timed. Armenia’s growing alignment with the West, evidenced by the potential military pact with the US and the EU, challenges Russia’s traditional influence in the region. The speculated withdrawal of Russian military from Armenia further complicates the South Caucasus’s security architecture, prompting Moscow to seek a counterbalance through Azerbaijan, which offers a direct conduit to markets in Türkiye and Iran, critical under the weight of Western sanctions.
The discussions during Aliyev’s visit, particularly around the North-South Transport Corridor, underscore Russia’s urgent need to redirect its economic channels towards Asia and the Persian Gulf to mitigate the impact of sanctions. The projected increase in cargo volumes along this corridor, from India through Azerbaijan to Europe, elevates Azerbaijan’s role as a critical transit hub, enhancing its strategic value to Russia.
Moreover, the informal nature of the meeting between Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including interactions with veterans of the Baikal-Amur Mainline, a project historically supervised by Aliyev’s father, signifies an attempt to foster a personal rapport and build a narrative of historical and cultural linkage, which complements their economic and strategic interests.
In conclusion, as Russia seeks to fortify its position in the South Caucasus amidst a retracting influence in Armenia and growing Western pressures, Azerbaijan emerges as a pivotal ally. The deepening cooperation between Baku and Moscow not only aims to exploit new economic opportunities but also to reassert Russia’s influence in a region where Western geopolitical interests are increasingly manifest. This complex interplay of history, economic necessity, and geopolitical strategy continues to shape the contours of Eastern European politics, with Azerbaijan playing an increasingly central role in the evolving geopolitical landscape.