Azerbaijan

Stalled Peace: Armenia’s Constitutional Dilemma and Azerbaijan’s Skepticism

by CASPRI

Since April this year, the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization process appeared to gain momentum. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made concessions for the peaceful return of four Azerbaijani villages in the Gazakh region to Baku’s control. This move was intended to kickstart the long-awaited border delimitation. However, these steps have met expected resistance from what some label as revanchist forces within Armenia. The Armenian opposition contends that returning these villages amounts to ceding sovereign territory, a decision they argue should be subject to a referendum as stipulated by Article 205 of the Armenian Constitution.

Despite these challenges, both nations have shown a willingness to sign a peace agreement. Yet, the demands from Baku highlight a significant hurdle: Azerbaijan insists on constitutional amendments in Armenia to renounce any territorial claims formally, viewing this as essential for lasting peace. This stance is grounded in Armenia’s Preamble to the Constitution, which references the Declaration of Independence, claiming Karabakh based on the decree of December 1, 1989, “On the reunification of the Armenian SSR and NKAO.”

Armenia faces a constitutional paradox. While the Armenian Foreign Ministry argues that domestic law should not obstruct international peace agreements, the necessity to amend the Constitution as voiced by Azerbaijan underscores a profound mistrust. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has emphasized the need to address Armenia’s constitutional references to territorial claims against Azerbaijan and Turkey as fundamental to the peace process.

The current political climate in Armenia complicates the feasibility of such amendments. Protests have erupted over the delimitation process, evolving into broader calls for Prime Minister Pashinyan’s resignation. Under this pressure, Pashinyan’s administration argues that constitutional amendments are a domestic matter unrelated to peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, a stance reiterated by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan in June.

This internal-external conflict dynamic suggests a lack of political will or capacity by Pashinyan to push through necessary reforms, risking the stagnation of the peace process. Moreover, Armenia’s geopolitical maneuvers, such as increasing anti-Russian rhetoric, freezing participation in the CSTO, and exploring closer ties with the EU and the US, indicate a strategic hedging approach that could further complicate negotiations.

Azerbaijan, perceiving these actions as non-committal, remains cautious about proceeding without firm guarantees, fearing that any peace treaty might be short-lived without constitutional amendments. The use of the non-functioning OSCE Minsk Group as a diplomatic tool by Armenia is viewed by Baku as a tactic to maintain status quo rather than a move towards genuine reconciliation. In conclusion, the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is fraught with constitutional, political, and geopolitical challenges. Armenia’s apparent reluctance to amend its Constitution as part of the peace process with Azerbaijan may serve as a significant barrier to achieving long-term stability in the region. This situation raises critical questions about the effectiveness of international diplomacy and the real intentions behind the declarative readiness for peace by both sides.

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