Azerbaijan

August 20, 2020

Azerbaijan Finds Itself Between Turkish-Russian Confrontation

by Jeyhun Mahmudlu

The military escalation between 12-15 July, in the Tovuz section of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, lies with Russia’s intention to increase its political and economic influence over Azerbaijan and Armenia. The clashes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border began close to the zone of the passage of main pipelines toward Turkey, which suggests that Russia is seeking to regain control of the Turkish gas market. Even Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was forced to indirectly admit this fact, who stated in an interview with the Trud newspaper that “the decision of the Armenian side to revive the old border checkpoint located 15 km from the Azerbaijani export pipelines caused heightened concern among some, an unjustified response from others and eventually launched a flywheel of confrontation with the most unpredictable consequences.”

This factor and the information spread in August about the supply of Russian weapons to Armenia during the July battles on the border with Azerbaijan caused a certain tension in Azerbaijani-Russian relations. Thus, the press service of the President of Azerbaijan spread the details of the telephone conversation that took place on August 12 between Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin. During a telephone conversation held on the initiative of the Azerbaijani side, Aliyev expressed concern to Putin about the intensity of deliveries of military cargo from Russia to Armenia. Aliyev noted that the volume of military cargo transported from Russia to Armenia immediately after the July clashes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, to this day using the airspace of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, amounted to over 400 tons, and stressed that the primary purpose of the phone call is to clarify this issue.

Nothing has been reported about Putin’s reaction to this remark by Aliyev. The Kremlin press service also disseminated a message about the telephone conversation between Putin and Aliyev. However, it did not indicate the discussion on the issue of arms supplies to Armenia. “An exchange of views was held on regional issues in the context of the exacerbation of the situation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian state border in July this year. The Russian side stressed the importance of preventing any actions that contribute to the escalation of tensions,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

These accusations against Russia on the part of the first person of Azerbaijan are voiced for the first time and indicate a sufficient degree of tension in bilateral relations. In recent years, the parties have repeatedly stressed the high level of strategic partnership. Attention is drawn to the fact that Azerbaijan did not stir up this scandal. For the Azerbaijani authorities, the main factor was that they brought their position to the attention of the Russian leadership.

In this regard, it cannot be ruled out that this line of behavior of Aliyev is mainly due to the recent increase in support from Turkey, as well as the concern of Western countries and corporations interested in the safe and uninterrupted supply of Azerbaijani oil and gas to Europe.

Appeals by Russian officials during the July battles to reduce tensions and search for peaceful ways run counter to the fact of arms supplies to Armenia. Over the past years, the leadership of Azerbaijan has tried to move the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process off the ground by discrediting the Armenian authorities in the eyes of Russia. The Kremlin’s efforts last year removed American diplomacy from the negotiation process. During this period, Armenia itself tried hard to change the negotiation format. In April, the Lavrov plan was again put on the agenda, which envisages a stage-by-stage settlement and the return of several regions to Azerbaijan around Nagorno-Karabakh. However, questions arose here, too – the implementation of this plan is fraught with danger for Moscow since it will lead to the loss of Russian positions in Armenia. However, as recent events have shown, this was another Kremlin ploy to tighten the status quo. Thus, the expectations of Azerbaijan, which for a long time counted on certain dividends from Russia for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, did not come true.

Against this background, there is an increase in Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, right up to the declaration of readiness to provide military assistance to Baku to eliminate the Armenian aggression. This is evidenced by the visit to Ankara of the ministers of foreign affairs and defense of Azerbaijan, the start of joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises, and the subsequent visit to Baku by the head of the defense department and the Chief of the General Staff of Turkey.

Turkey is vitally interested in the uninterrupted and safe transportation of Azerbaijani gas through its territory to Europe. In addition, Turkey’s interests increasingly clash with Russian interests in Syria and Libya. Therefore, Ankara seeks to get rid of Russian gas exports and increase purchases of blue fuel from Azerbaijan. These factors irritate Moscow. In late July, a telephone conversation took place between Erdogan and Putin, in which the latter noted the need to refrain from further exacerbation and interference in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, indicating Moscow’s unwillingness to involve Ankara in this process.

At the same time, many Russian analysts do not hide their open irritation with Turkey’s activation in the South Caucasus. Russian expert Pavel Felgenhauer in an interview with RBK, even said that Moscow could use nuclear weapons to prevent the defeat of Armenia.

Russian experts hope that the current leadership of Armenia will draw the correct conclusions from the July aggravation. In their opinion, the escalation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the subsequent activity of Turkey in the region showed that Russia is the uncontested guarantor of security for Yerevan. This also leads to another conclusion: attempts to question Russia’s leading role in the Karabakh settlement will lead not so much to a decrease in Russian influence as to unpredictability and chaos in the region.

Against this background, talks about creating a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan have intensified. The Azerbaijani-Turkish joint large-scale military tactical and aviation exercises taking place in Nakhchivan, unexpectedly coinciding with the aggravation of the border, gave rise to the public to think about the possibility and necessity of deploying the Turkish army on the territory of Azerbaijan.

In this regard, Turkish political scientist and expert on Russian foreign policy Kerim Has noted in an interview with Deutsche Welle that more and more signs indicate that the Turkish government wants to permanently create a military base in Azerbaijan. “This can become a serious reason for the conflict between Ankara and Moscow,” he admits. However, it should be noted that the military doctrine of Azerbaijan does not imply the deployment of foreign military bases in the country.

In previous years, hypotheses were put forward by experts and political circles of neighboring states that Israel’s military bases were allegedly deployed in Azerbaijan and that a springboard was being prepared for the deployment of military formations of NATO countries, in particular the United States. However, the military doctrine of Azerbaijan makes such assumptions impossible. Moreover, there is no special need to deploy a Turkish military base in Nakhchivan, which is a stone’s throw from Turkey. In the event of a threat, Turkey can redeploy its forces to Nakhchivan in a matter of minutes; for this, a military base on that territory is not needed.

In this situation, the Azerbaijani authorities are interested in increasing Turkey’s role in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Thus, the Azerbaijani authorities are promoting the thesis that the OSCE Minsk Group can no longer provide mediation efforts to resolve the conflict. In this regard, the pro-government media voiced the idea of ​​Turkey’s inclusion in the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairing countries to speed up the resolution of the conflict. Geographic proximity, historical ties, and geopolitical interests of countries make this format more effective for solving the problem than the participation of Western countries. However, this can cause strong opposition from Russia and Armenia. The experience of past years shows that Moscow fears an open confrontation with Ankara, preferring compromise solutions to emerging issues. In this regard, Moscow may continue to support Yerevan. The statement made by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan after the July events on the border, in which he began to put forward tough conditions on the negotiation process to Azerbaijan, confirms this assumption.