Azerbaijan

Russia Seeks to Break the Ice in Relations with Azerbaijan

by Jeyhun Mahmudlu

Azerbaijani-Russian relations were remembered for continuing tensions over the supply of weapons to Armenia during the July 2020 battles on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. This fact showed all the fallacy of the strategy implemented by Azerbaijan over the past years to discredit Armenia as a country glorifying fascism and propagandizing Russophobia.

Despite the current government’s policy, Armenia remains an outpost of Russian interests in the South Caucasus, and the presence of the 102nd military base is evidence of this. Judging by the development of events, Moscow does not care who is in power in Yerevan as long as this circumstance does not affect the further fate of the 102nd military base, which is mainly supported by the state budget of Armenia.

The statements of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during his visit to Baku on August 25 that cargo transportation was associated with the construction of social facilities on the territory of the 102nd Russian base in Armenia did not convince the Azerbaijani side. For example, Hikmet Hajiyev, an aide to the President of Azerbaijan on foreign policy, answering journalists’ questions, said that the arguments of Russia do not suit Baku, asking to clarify the situation with the provision of Armenia with weapons. Further, in an interview with the Turkish TV channel Haber Global, Hajiyev said, “we could not get answers (from the Russian side) to the questions for what purpose this weapon was supplied.” A similar thought was repeated by the deputy of the Milli Majlis Azay Guliyev, who stated that Azerbaijan expects Russia to provide convincing arguments and a satisfactory explanation about the fact of sending weapons to Armenia.

The decision of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry not to participate in the Kavkaz-2020 command-staff exercises held in Russia can also be considered a demarche. The Azerbaijani side limited itself to sending two servicemen to this event as observers.

Against this background, the President of Azerbaijan awarded several Russian figures with the Dostlug (Friendship) order. These are the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin, the Russian businessman Farhad Ahmedov, the chairman of the Russian Children’s Fund Albert Likhanov, the rector of MGIMO Anatoly Torkunov, and the head of the Russian company LUKOIL Vagit Alekperov. Such a remarkable frequency of awarding Russian leaders with the Azerbaijani Order allows us to assert that Baku is not showing open hostility to Moscow but dissatisfaction with the fact of favoring Armenia.

Moscow also took steps that can be assessed as a positive sign. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, following a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov in Moscow, said that “more intensive negotiations” on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would not hurt. Lavrov also announced plans to organize a meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan soon. Moreover, during a meeting with the speaker of the Azerbaijani parliament, Gafarova, on September 23, Lavrov, touching upon the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, noted that “Russia, as the co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, supports the solution of the problem and spares no effort in this area. Russia supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,” – said the Russian minister.

In turn, the Azerbaijani leadership says that Armenia is preparing to carry out new military provocations. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev stated this in an interview with several local TV channels. In his words, the provocative statements of the Armenian leadership give grounds to say that Yerevan has withdrawn from the negotiations. Aliyev believes that the ongoing provocations on the front line are a logical continuation of Armenia’s policy. The purpose of these provocations is to disrupt the negotiations and then blame Azerbaijan for their disruption.

In addition to the militant rhetoric, Baku is intensively exploiting the topic of the resettlement of Syrian and Lebanese Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, attention is focused on the fact that after the resettlement of the Lebanese Armenians to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, the leadership of Armenia also deployed “special forces” of the terrorist organization of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) here. These facts are quoted by the Turkish edition Cümhuriyyet, citing its sources in the field of regional security. In turn, the Azeri publication haqqin.az also provided information on the movement of Kurdish militants from Iraq to Karabakh.

Along with the aggressive policy of the Armenian authorities, which unleashed new clashes with Azerbaijan, the activation and deepening of military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey have activated some regional powers, provoking a new escalation of the Karabakh conflict. It is assumed that this information leak is a joint step by the authorities of Azerbaijan and Turkey to put pressure on Russia in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Over the years, Baku has tried to present its occupied territories as a center for the illegal circulation of weapons and drugs. Now, it intends to draw attention as a source of international terrorism.

However, judging by the reaction of the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, according to which Moscow does not have verified data on the resettlement of Lebanese Armenians in Karabakh, one can conclude that the Kremlin does not intend to follow the lead of Baku and Ankara. To defuse the situation, as a gesture towards warmer relations with Baku, Russia published a list of Azerbaijani citizens who were supposed to be used in the interests of the Kremlin. For example, the Russian Dossier Center, which specializes in covering the activities of the secret services, published a study on the Kremlin’s interference in the internal politics of the South Caucasus countries called “Beard” from Yerevan and soft power in Baku. The logic behind publishing this list is that the Kremlin, by merging its agents of influence, makes Baku understand that it wants to continue its previous relations with Azerbaijan and, as a gesture of goodwill, presents them with its residency.